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Abstract
This paper reports the results of an inductive case study about asymmetries of knowledge between 
marketing and engineering subunits in firms engaged in software product development. The 
asymmetries of technical and user related knowledge are salient to software since the artifact itself is 
invisible and complex, and have been previously reported as a key challenge in product oriented 
software development.
We use qualitative interview data from six firms using multiple informant design. The analysis follows 
the constant comparison method where the initial constructs were defined ex ante, but their exact 
relationship and the moderating constructs were derived from the data.
We found that not only is there a strong asymmetry of what the focal units know, but that this has an 
effect on software product development performance. Our analysis suggests that the negative effects of 
knowledge asymmetry are negatively moderated by presence of a strong boundary spanning individual 
and also suppressed by organizational change.
Keywords: Knowledge, asymmetries of knowledge, shared knowledge, software development, product 
development.
1 INTRODUCTION
Developing software products requires collaboration between several functional units of a firm
(Karlsson, Dahstedt, Regnell, Dag and Persson, 2007). In this paper, we examine the effect of 
knowledge asymmetries – the effect of uneven distribution of different types of knowledge - between
different functional units and what impact this phenomenon has on software product development 
performance. The significance of effects of shared knowledge and distributed knowledge on product 
development has been documented in the product development (Ottum and Moore, 1997) and 
management (Hoopes and Postrel, 1999) literature, but knowledge as a general topic remains largely 
under-explored in the context of software development (Bjornson and Dingsoyr, In Press).
Software development provides a fruitful context for studying knowledge sharing and cross-functional 
integration, since the intangibility and complexity of software creates challenges for sensemaking
(Sonnentag, 1998; Weick, 1995). That is, the complexity of the technology tends to make the internal 
structures of systems less observable, and intangibility prevents the artefact from providing any visible 
cues that would help people to understand what happens beneath the user interface. As a consequence, 
when technology is complex, the perception of structure is strongly affected by the interactions that 
the focal person has with the technological artefacts. For example, in the case of information systems, 
it is often the features, not structure that acts as a trigger for sensemaking in the case of users (Griffith, 
1999). In contrast, engineers often tend to form their own mental models based on highly technical 
details (Sonnentag, 1998).
The previous research in the interdepartmental sensemaking in new product development has mainly 
focused on traditional and stable industries. However, several sources provide evidence that 
organizations that operate within more turbulent environments and develop more complex technology 
have different sensemaking processes than in their counterparts in less volatile industries (Bogner and 
Barr, 2000; Dougherty, Borrelli, Munir and O'Sullivan, 2000). Clearly, this indicates that the theories 
constructed using data from more traditional industries should be complemented by studies in the 
context of the software industry.
This paper presents the results of a theory building multiple case study of six Finnish software product 
firms. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: We will first introduce the key constructs of the 
paper, as defined prior to data collection, and review the relevant literature. The section thereafter 
describes the data and the empirical study design. The main part of the paper consists of presenting 
summary results of the analysis providing a clear link between the results and data. Finally, we 
conclude by evaluating the results and presenting suggestions for future research.
2 KEY CONSTRUCTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
In qualitative research, the researcher often strives to develop theory based on data without any a 
priori assumptions of the key constructs, but this is neither necessary nor always desirable (Eisenhardt, 
1989). In this paper we build a theory about the causal dependency between inter-functional 
knowledge asymmetries and product development performance. Based on the literature review, we 
hypothesise that knowledge asymmetries do have a causal relationship with product development 
performance. However, while several effects of asymmetries of knowledge have been reported, the 
exact nature and the role of these asymmetries on software product development are not yet known. 
Due to this, the present paper adopts an inductive theory building research design.
2.1 Knowledge asymmetries
While several different theories explain different types of knowing in organizations, we still lack a 
general theory in the area (Fiol, 2002). It is generally agreed that one of the strengths of a modern 
organization is that it can know a lot more than an individual member of the organization (Grant, 
1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Spender and Grant, 1996), and the knowledge of the organization is 
not necessarily tied to individuals, but tends to be sticky even when people change (Brown and 
Duguid, 2001). There is an agreement that knowledge resides in routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
network ties and coordination (Kogut and Zander, 1996), and technology (Orlikowski, 1992). 
However, understanding how an organization can accomplish task demanding complex knowledge is 
only part of a bigger picture of knowledge. While the procedural knowledge is embedded in the 
organization and routines, semantic knowledge, or establishing of meaning can be considered as an 
emergent accomplishment through the ongoing process of sensemaking where people interact and 
socialize to create meaning for different events and cues (Weick, 1995).
We define knowledge asymmetry as a condition that is created when different people or different 
organizational units posses different stocks of knowledge. In other words, knowledge asymmetry is 
the result of the uneven dispersion of different types of knowledge within the organization (Becker, 
2001). Since knowledge is accumulated over time as result of experiences, and different positions 
inside a firm are exposed to different types of experiences, it is inevitable that knowledge is not 
symmetrically distributed within a firm. However, the degree of asymmetries, or the relative lack of 
common ground, can change from one organization to another.
The stock of knowledge possessed by a person affects how they give meaning to different information 
and situations causing people to interpret their observations in a way that fits their belief structure
(Gioia and Poole, 1984). In the context of information systems and software development, people with 
technical and non-technical backgrounds view systems under development often quite differently. 
These differences are often both a product and a cause of emergence of two separate communities of 
practice (Bechky, 2003) within a software firm: the marketing people, and the engineering people.
Wile engineers tend to make sense of the technology and structure their knowledge through the 
technical architecture (Sonnentag, 1998; von Mayrhauser and Vans, 1995), the non-technical people in 
the marketing team think about the technology through features and user interface (Griffith, 1999; 
Orlikowski, 2000).
In all but the smallest firms, there is an organizational boundary between these two focal units, 
partially caused by the knowledge asymmetries due to different backgrounds and different functional 
role within the firm. It is generally harder to communicate over the boundary and progressively harder 
as the boundary widens (Carlile, 2004). As a workaround to the problem of knowledge asymmetries, 
organizations often tacitly implement transactional memory systems, where the organizational 
knowledge is a sum of individuals’ knowledge and collective awareness of who knows what (Austin, 
2003). However, these systems can only partially solve the problem of asymmetric distribution of 
knowledge, and communications over disciplinary boundaries and combining market and 
technological knowledge remain problematic in software product development (Karlsson et al., 2007).
2.2 Product development performance
Product development performance can be considered to be a three dimensional construct with 
effectiveness, efficiency and innovativeness as sub-dimensions (Kusunoki, Nonaka and Nagata, 1998): 
Efficiency refers to the goodness of the rate that the resources are transformed into outputs. This 
dimension has a close fit to the process performance dimension of software development performance 
(Jiang, Klein, Hwang, Huang and Hung, 2004). Effectiveness refers to the goodness of the product not 
only in terms of product quality – a common measurement of software development performance 
(Jiang et al., 2004) – but also how well it fits the needs of the markets. Finally, innovativeness refers to 
the ability conceive new ideas and develop these into commercially successful products or product 
features.
Asymmetries of knowledge affect can affect the product development performance through several 
different mechanisms. Generally, asymmetries of knowledge hinder transfer of information relevant 
for the development process. For example, the asymmetry can increase the transaction costs of 
communication hence decreasing the amount of information sharing (Carlile, 2004), cause bias for 
using the knowledge that is shared and omitting what is not shared (Gigone and Hastie, 1993; Stasser, 
Stewart and Wittenbaum, 1995). This can affect product development performance in several ways: 
First, lack of knowledge can cause ‘glitches’, that is, developing something that is not what was 
intended (Hoopes and Postrel, 1999). Second, knowledge asymmetries can cause problems to be 
undetected (Cramton, 2001). Third, asymmetries hinder effective coordination of work (Faraj and 
Sproull, 2000).
However, asymmetries of knowledge can also have a positive impact on software product
development performance. Previous research has identified that innovation, defined as creating 
something novel and useful, occurs when knowledge from different domains is combined and 
processed (Carlile, 2004; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Marsh and Stock, 2006). If the degree of 
knowledge asymmetries is low, this is likely to lead to reduced creative abrasion and hence decreased 
innovativeness (Leonard-Barton, 1995).
Clearly, there is not a lack of theories considering the knowledge asymmetries and their effect on 
product development performance. However, the current literature is not clear about the overall net 
effect of knowledge asymmetries on software product development performance, calling for an 
inductive study examining the nature of the relationship between these two constructs.
3 DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Research strategy
This paper follows theory building multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989). More specifically 
we follow the “variance study” design (Van de Ven, 2007). In this approach, novel theory is 
formulated as a result of thorough and disciplined analysis of empirical material in such a way that the 
researcher goes to study the data, at first, in an exploratory manner and then discovers causal ties from 
it, making comparisons with existing literature. Our approach to this research follows that of 
Eisenhardt (1989) even though it has commonalities with those described by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) and Yin (2003) in more recent literature. In this method, multiple cases are selected for study 
due to the replication and thus a stronger claim on validity that they enable (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003). 
3.2 Sample
Our sampling strategy follows theoretical sampling as described below. Data for this paper was 
collected from eight firms, but two cases were later dropped due to achieving theoretical saturation 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998) without the need for further data collection warranting finalizing data 
collection for these cases. Since this study is about interdepartmental knowledge asymmetries, we 
focus on firms where interdepartmental communication is rich to gain understanding of the differences 
in semantics of the knowledge (Carlile, 2004) between departments. We chose smaller firms for two 
reasons: First, smaller firms rely more on interpersonal coordination mechanisms while larger firms 
build processes and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Due to the nature of product development 
capability as a dynamic capability, these best practice routines often emerge and spread across firms as 
best practices (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Due to this, the variance between firms was expected to 
be higher in smaller firms that rely on interpersonal coordination than larger firms that rely 
predominantly on routines. Second, Finnish software industry is characterized by a large number of 
small firms, and hence this was also a choice of convenience.
Our study design requires sampling firms, which have clear division of labour and clear internal team 
structure limiting the size of the firms included in the population where the sample is drawn, and 
hence we chose 20 people to be a minimum size for a firm to be included in the study. Similarly, we 
did not want to include highly entrepreneurial start-up firms for several reasons: First, these firms 
often have not institutionalized processes and organizational structures, and would not be comparable 
with more mature firms. Second, entrepreneurial firms are often championed by the entrepreneur, 
which significantly affects the sensemaking processes of the organization (Hill and Levenhagen, 
1995). Third, start-up firms in the Finnish software industry are often technology driven, and hence 
they might not balance between market and technology orientation as a more mature firm does 
(Drazin, Glynn and Kazanjian, 1999). The minimum age was set at 5 years. Due to practical reasons, 
the population was limited to firms whose head office was located in Southern Finland.
A sample of eight firms was drawn from along two dimensions: environmental turbulence and product 
complexity. The first dimension, turbulence, was chosen because existing research indicates that 
organizations who operate in turbulent environments have different sensemaking processes and adopt 
different organizational structures than organizations within less turbulent environments (Bogner and 
Barr, 2000; Calantone, Garcia and Droge, 2003). The second dimension was chosen for two reasons, 
first it was hypothesised by the authors that more complex products will lead to more knowledge 
asymmetries and second, existing research shows that product complexity affects both organizational 
design (Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2004) and product development performance (Rajiv, Gordon and 
Sandra, 1998). We identified the four quadrants of turbulence-complexity matrix as theoretically 
interesting groups. We chose two firms from each group based on the convenience of the location and 
contacted these for interview. When data were analyzed, theoretical saturation was achieved before 
finalizing two cases, and hence we exclude these cases from the analysis. Table 1 presents a summary 
description of the six cases that were included.
The unit of analysis selected was the software firm. Several types of evidence were used: interviews, 
observations, and secondary sources such as company websites, press releases, and items from the 
news media. Altogether 32 interviews provided data for the final analysis Majority of the data was 
collected during spring 2007, but secondary data was obtained also throughout the entire analysis and 
writing phase of this paper. All interviews were conducted in physical meetings and all informants 
provided their permission for taping the interview, and taped interviews were later transcribed for 
analysis. Extensive field notes were take following the 24 hour rule (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The 
interviews were semi-structured to allow the conversation to take directions according to the 
informants’ responses, and to allow an in-depth inquiry into the nature of the subject issues. 
3.3 Data analysis
The interviews resulted in approximately 500 pages of interview transcripts and field notes with single 
spacing and 12pt font. The analysis comprised within- and cross-case analyses as outlined by 
Eisenhardt (1989). This involves, first, the extensive study of each case individually, treating it in the 
way of an “experiment,” and typing in depth case descriptions of each firm. Second, similarities and 
differences in two or more cases were sought such that the emergence of new categories and concepts 
is facilitated. These differences were identified by inductively seeking patterns in the data, and 
abductively by seeking plausible explanations for observed variations of outcomes. Once identified, 
these patters were approached deductively as to identify if the effect was universal in the sample, and 
where needed the emergent theory was revised or rejected. In this iterative manner rotation between 
data, emerging theory, and our knowledge of prior literature were employed in the analysis process.
Tables were used to present the variance in constructs and as aids when searching for patters in data 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1984). Data analysis was performed with the help of NVivo 
2.0 qualitative data analysis software.
Triangulation was made use of by using several informants for each case to reduce some of the 
possible biases in the data, such as those caused by potential ex post rationalization. As is typical for 
qualitative research in general (Eisenhardt, 1989), the analysis phase overlapped the data collection 
phase.
Firm Summary description Product Organization Informants
Alpha Alpha has its roots at the late 80's 
when it was started as a subunit 
of a larger company. Currently 
the firm has around 30 
employees and can be considered 
a mature firm.
An information systems product 
for public sector. The product 
always requires an implementation 
project and training.
The company has three offices in 
different regions with geographically 
dispersed product development. 
Three main organizational units are 
product development, sales and 
marketing, and services. One 
development team is off-shored.
CEO, CTO, 
COO, PM, 
Bravo Bravo was started the beginning 
of this decade. The company is 
currently growing fast and had 
approximately 30 employees at 
the time majority of the 
interviews were conducted. 
Bravo received first round of 
venture capital funding during 
the interview period.
A data mining and network 
analysis tool to be used with 
information systems that contain 
transaction data. The product 
development was started at two 
years go and version 1.0 was 
released during the interview 
period. The product can be 
considered to be new to the world 
innovative.
The firm has one office and three 
organizational units related to the 
development of the system. In 
addition to characteristic engineering 
and marketing departments, the firm 
has a science department which 
develops the complex mathematical 
algorithms used in the product. The 
firm has shared product manager 
position with two employees.
P, CTO, CS, 
PM (technical), 
PM (marketing)
Charlie Charlie was started during the 
late 90's. The company was not 
initially information systems 
provider, but has gone trough 
several transformations and 
restructurings to become one. 
The firm is now employing 
roughly 30 people and expects 
moderate growth.
The company produces technology 
that is used to build media 
functionality to intranets and 
public www-sites. The second 
generation of the system was 
expected to be release soon after 
the interview period replacing the 
first generation product that 
suffered from significant 
architectural decay.
The firm has two offices. The head 
office is mainly responsible for sales 
and implementation while the side 
office does product development and 
running the servers on which the 
system is provisioned to the 
customers. Charlie has three 
organizational units that are linked 
to developing the product: 
engineering, sales and marketing and 
to lesser extent media production.
CEO,VP, CMO, 
CTO, SM
Delta Delta is a partially owned 
subsidiary of an engineering 
office. has its roots in the mid 
70's when the development of the 
current product was started. The 
company is mature and stable 
employing 25 people. 
Delta produces application 
software which is used in specialty 
engineering. The product is 
currently more than 20 years old, 
although it has gone through 
several generations. Delta 
considers its software to be very 
complex and highly sophisticated.
The firm has one office which is co-
located with the head office of the 
parent company. The parent 
company is a heavy user of the 
application and this is leveraged in 
beta testing. Delta has three 
organizational units, engineering, 
sales and marketing, and services. 





Echo Echo is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of another software 
firm containing all product 
business of the parent company. 
Echo was established at around 
2000. At the time of the 
interviews, the firm employed 
approximately 30 people mainly 
i product development. During 
the interview period, the firm 
received first round of venture 
capital funding.
Echo's product is a multiplatform 
communications client that is used 
in the telecom industry with a 
variety of third party server 
systems. The second generation of 
the product is currently being 
prepared. The software can be 
considered to be very innovative 
and its market is only starting to 
emerge. 
The firm is co-located with the 
parent company, but there is only 
little collaboration with the parent. 
Three organizational units 
participate in the development: small 
sales and marketing department, 
engineering, and customer projects. 
Product ownership is somewhat 
vague, and CEO participates actively 
in development decisions.
P, CEO, CTO, 
CMO, D, PM
Golf Golf is a family owned company 
which was founded at the 70's. 
The company is currently 
planning a transformation to 
enable international growth. At 
the time of interviews, the firm 
employed approximately 40 
people. The firm is mature and 
stable, but is planning for 
international growth.
Golf produces an information 
system that is used to facilitate the 
sales processes and inventory 
management in a particular 
industry. Application is provided 
as ASP. Data from sales 
transactions are analyzed and fed 
back to the system for business 
intelligence purposes. The large 
role of customer data as a resource 
has enabled the firm to crate a 
monopoly position that is hard to 
challenge.
The company has one office in 
Central Europe and two offices in 
Finland. Product development is 
performed in both of these domestic
offices. Four organizational units 
participate in development of the 
product: engineering, data analysis, 
services, and sales and marketing. 
The product ownerships is vague, 
and the CEO actively participates 
when product development decisions 
are made.
CEO, SM, CS, 




Informant positions are indicative. For example, the highest person responsible for technology is termed CTO regardless of the real title. 
P = President, VP = Vice President, CEO = Chief Executive Officer, CTO = Chief Technology Officer, PM = Product Manager, CMO = 
Chief Marketing Officer, COO = Chief Operating Officer, CSA = Chief Software Architect, CS = Chief Scientist, CDO= Chief 
Development Officer, SM = Sales Person, D = Designer, SD= Software Developer
Table 1 Summary description of the cases 
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Tables 2 and Table 3 present the values of the final constructs for the cases with linking to data. 
During the interviews and data analysis it became obvious that asymmetries in two classes of 
knowledge were most salient to the development of software products: “I have a technical background 
so I understand the product, and I have also done customer project so I understand how the software 
is used” explained Alpha’s product manager. In several other occasions it was also apparent that the 
most influential asymmetries of knowledge were when product development did not understand the 
market and use of software or when sales did not understand the technical aspects of the system: “One 
simple example is digital signing. Our sales people have not necessarily understood that purchasing of 
the module is not sufficient, but the customer needs to acquire also card readers and another type of 
server with connections to public network. Also it is very hard to understand what is the difference of 
publishing information on another system and performing integration.”
Similarly, product development has often less than perfect understanding about the use of the 
software: “It was a problem with entering data, but I do not remember exactly what it was. Our 
product development had solved the issue elegantly and technically correctly, but from the custome’sr 
perspective it was a step backwards.” Moreover, it was evident that sales and marketing’s ignorance 
of the software development process had a negative effect: ”Our sales people do not really understand 
the development process and they want to push new features when we are trying to make stable 
software.”
On the other hand, it became clear that the too much shared knowledge leads to groupthink and 
decreasing ability to absorb new information and generate ideas (Jansen, Van den Bosch and 
Volberda, 2005): “We have worked together so long that everyone knows the software well. I guess we 
are kind of threading water with this software, everyone is doing their job but not really innovating.”
Moreover, one product manager with a boundary spanning role acknowledged: “When I think the 
software as a sales person, I consider the customer’s processes and the value that customer gets from 
our product. But when I switch the engineer’s hat on, I often consider only the technical 
implementation and what would look elegant … That brings two different views to the issue and this is 
not necessary a problem, but that both parties can bring their understanding together.” Based on 
these accounts and the evidence of relationship between asymmetries of knowledge and product 
development performance presented in Tables 2 and Table 3 we draw the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Asymmetries of knowledge have an inverted U-type relations ship with 
product development performance.
One factor seems to affect the effect of asymmetries of knowledge on the product development 
performance. Charlie had a strong vice president level person with both technical and business 
background as a strong product champion. Interestingly, in both of the organizations the product 
owner was officially someone else in the organization. These findings are contradictory to recent study 
be Ebert (2007), which argued that product manager is often like a mini-CEO, and that product 
manager is the most important person in development organization. We find that it is not necessarily 
the product manager, but a product owner or champion who acts as a broker between the different 
functional units can be highly valuable for a firm. The CTO of Charlie elaborated: “Jack has always 
the final word on the product. … If I need to know something I always ask Jack”. Similarly, Echo had 
a product champion with technical and marketing background, although not as strong as Charlie. 
Neither of these two firms seemed to have any real difficulties caused by asymmetries of knowledge 
between marketing and engineering. Based on these observations and evidence in Tables 2 and Table 
3, we present:
Proposition 2: The presence of a strong boundary spanning individual decreases the negative 
effects of knowledge asymmetries.
The second proposition becomes almost evident when one considers that deciding on information 
systems requirements is dictated by organizational power (Bergman, King and Lyytinen, 2002). If 
there is a power full boundary spanning individual he spends time explaining the relevant issues for 
engineering and marketing in their respective languages and hence acts as a communication link and 
translator over the pragmatic boundary between the units.
Finally, our data indicates that asymmetries of knowledge can create conflict and cause a feedback 
loop. In the case of Delta and Golf, the asymmetry had built up and created conflict. When people did 
not share sufficient common ground, the organization started to feel the negative effects of 
professionalism. This was caused by institutionalizing of roles and routines and seriously hindered 
effective decision making in product development decision. The strongest candidate construct for 
explaining this in our data is organizational change or the lack of that. Hence we propose:
Proposition 3: Organizational change negatively moderates (dampens) the effect of negative 
effects of asymmetries of knowledge.
Contrary to our initial assumptions, we did not find a strong role of environmental turbulence or 
product complexity on the relationship, as is evident when examining Tables 2 and Table 3.






Alpha A lot of the key people interviewed had a technical 
background and had a relatively long history with the 
product. The interviewees had little difficulties in 
describing the more technical aspects of the system.
Low Not really innovative, but can solve client problems 
effectively. Some quality problems in the past. Some 
glitches are reported. Several informants reported that 
growth could be achieved in the private sector, but it 
seems that product development has not been able to 
create a truly compelling feature set for this segment. 
Low
Bravo There are clearly three different communities of
practice within the firm: programmers, algorithm 
developers and business people. These have some 
problems understanding each others, but due to 
mutual trust problems can be solved rapidly.
Med The product is technologically advanced and 
technically of high quality. The company considers 
itself to be highly innovative and customer oriented. 
Schedule slips due to unrealistic effort estimates seem 
to be largest problems in development.
High
Charlie Sales and project business department considers the 
product as a black box and does not seem to have a 
clear idea of how the product is developed. Moreover, 
the sales and product development are geographically 
separated, which increases the difference between 
these units.
High The company develops new generations from its 
product at an astonishing speed. The company seems 
to be really innovative, and has a decent track record 
in solving customer problems. However, there have 
been some technical weaknesses in the products.
Med
Delta All people seem to know the product well. There is 
technical jargon related to the product. But key people 
have learned to know that. Sales argue that 
engineering does not understand them and visa versa. 
Although most of the people have a similar technical 
background and share a long history, cross-functional 
integration seems hard to accomplish. 
High The company has been able to survive in the market 
for more than 20 years. However, currently the 
product development is not proceeding as fast as the 
company would desire. Also, there are some problems 
in staying on schedule and prioritization of different 
requirements is often done in a non-optimal way. 
Low
Echo The sales people do not generally have technical 
background and the engineering function is somewhat 
isolated from the environment. Although this has 
caused differences in knowledge stocks of these 
functions, there seems to be sufficient amount of 
common ground and frequent interaction.
Med Product development is almost always behind 
schedules due to overstretching itself. However, Echo 
has been able to deliver products that can be 
characterized as best designed in the market with fast 
pace and sufficient amount of technical quality.
High
Golf Golf has a clear separation of concerns between the 
four units that participate in product development 
decisions. Each function has its own area of expertise, 
and does not necessarily share much with other units. 
A moderate degree of conflict within the organization 
deepens the gaps between units. Sales staff largely 
consider the product as a black box.
High Golf has a secure market position due to the large 
positive feedback effects in their business model. 
This, in combination of the relatively low-tech target 
market does not require high performance product 
development. It seems that the firm is not really 
innovative and relatively slow in product 
development, but can deliver sufficiently high quality.
Low
Table 2 Key variables










Alpha Most of the clients are in the 
public sector, which in general is 
not fast moving. Some new 
technologies have been introduced 
recently, but the product offerings 
have remained relatively stable 
over time.
Low The product is an information system
that is used with a web interface. 
High degree of understanding of 
customers processes is required to 
develop this system, but technically 
it is not particularly complex.
Low Decisions are made in product steering 
committee or by individual developers. 
Product manager should record all 
change requests.
Med The size of the organization has 
remained relatively stable over the 
years and staff has years of 
experience working together. 
Low
Bravo The product is new to the world, 
but the development of the 
underlying technology seems to be 
relatively predictable
Med Several Ph.D. level researchers are 
employed in the algorithm 
development. The software interfaces 
with third party information systems 
on customer servers
High The commercial product manager has 
the responsibility over the product, but 
in practice the technical product 
manager seems to use more power. 
There is some degree of about how 
requirements should be managed.
Low The organization is growing rapidly 
and recruiting new people constantly.
High
Charlie The product is aimed on a market 
that is highly affected by fast 
development of communications 
and media standards. 
High The product contains some of the 
latest media technology, but other 
than this, it is not particularly 
complex.
Med The company does not have a person 
with a title of product manager, but it is 
very clear who calls the decisions. This 
particular person is currently involved 
in sales and has previously overseen 
the software development.
High The organization has changed 
somewhat recently, since a unit was 
sold. Prior to selling the unit, the 
firm had grown at a fast pace. 
Med
Delta Technology enables new features 
that have not been possible earlier, 
but in sum the product technology 
has not changed much recently. 
The target market is relatively 
stable in terms of technological 
development.
Low Large application software, which 
has complex data structures. Also, 
the application uses 3D graphics, 
which creates more complexity.
High There is a clear political boundary 
between engineering and marketing. 
Although the CEO seems to have a 
boundary spanning role, he is not 
actively using his power in product 
management related issues.
Low The organization is currently 
undergoing a small structural change. 
However, it is likely that the effects 
are realized only slowly, as most of 
the key people have been working in 
the same firm for ten years or more.
Low
Echo Echo's product relies on advances 
in communications technology. 
The market and different technical 
standards are still developing and 
the growth potential, but also the 
uncertainty is high.
High The software relies on third party 
servers and must run on several 
different platforms. The large 
number of configurations increases 
complexity of the relatively simple 
core product.
Med The director of the unit is in charge of 
marketing, but also understands the 
technology well. He uses some power 
in product development decisions, but 
is counterbalanced by equally strong 
technical product manager.
Med The company is growing fast, and is 
undergoing an organizational 
transformation.
High
Golf Golf has a secure market position 
with dominating market share. The 
target market is not very 
technology oriented, and hence 
things change only slowly.
Low The product contains some 
sophisticated analysis functionality, 
but these do not seem to be deeply 
integrated to the product. The 
product is offered as ASP and there 
are only little connections to external 
systems.
Low Although the CEO has both technical 
and marketing background and uses his 
power occasionally, in sum there is no 
clear product owner. There is even 
some ambiguity on who makes the 
product development decisions.
Low The company changed one key 
person to another position during the 
interview periods, but as a family 
owned venture, things are generally 
very stable
Low
Table 3 Moderator and control variables
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of our data from six cases indicates that there are often strong asymmetries of technical 
knowledge and market and use related knowledge. Both views are required, but if the gap between the 
engineering and marketing units is too wide, product development cannot proceed in an optimal 
manner. On the other hand, we found that too much consensus causes groupthink and reduces the 
understanding of the customers and the chance of identifying new trends in the markets.
In sum, the results are in line with existing research on cross functional integration, and provide 
evidence that the well known positive effect of heavy weight product champion has a positive effect in 
product development also in the context of software products. The main contribution of the paper is 
identification of the inverse U-shaped relationship between asymmetries of knowledge and product 
development performance. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that organizational change negatively 
moderated the negative effects of this main effect, but technological turbulence does not. One 
explanation for this is that technological turbulence affects product development performance directly. 
Finnish firms are often said to be technology focused, and hence it is not surprising that in this sample 
firms operating in technologically turbulent market seem to have better product development 
performance.
This study, like any other, is not without limitations. For making sure that the quality of our research is 
as good as possible, we have followed the generally accepted instructions by Yin (Yin and Campbell, 
2002) for case studies in general and Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles and Huberman (1984) for data 
analysis. Reliability was enhanced through triangulation and by rigorously documenting the research 
process, and by using qualitative data analysis package to enable traceability of the coding process. 
The reliance on solely the first author’s judgement in coding can pose a threat to reliability, since due 
to confidentiality were.
Regarding sampling, we followed theoretical sampling using the polar opposites approach along two 
dimensions identified in the previous literature. While the exact ratings of the firms along these 
dimensions evolved during the coding, we achieved adequate spread. Using convenience sampling on 
the second stage of the sampling process should not pose threats to validity. However, a general 
weakness in all studies using a limited number of cases is that the generalizability can only be 
established in a theoretical, but not in a statistical sense. As a consequence, further research should 
focus on statistical testing of our theory. Another possible avenue for research would be to focus on 
the micro-processes of knowledge integration and the particular challenges create by the abstract
nature of software as a product, perhaps through the means of an ethnographic study. 
The practical implications of our results are twofold. First, we show evidence that not only the widely 
known gap of knowledge between the technical and non-technical personnel of software product firms 
is inevitable, but also that moderate levels of asymmetry are desirable. Our results emphasize the 
importance of boundary spanning product champion. However, contrary to earlier results, we show 
that this champion does not necessarily need to b the product manager, but any person with sufficient 
power can play the role.
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